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TURNING THE PROTESTER INTO A 
PARTNER FOR DEVELOPMENT:  
THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE 
CONSULTATION BETWEEN  
THE WTO & NGOs 
Maura Blue Jeffords∗ 
If the WTO expects to have public support grow for our en-
deavors, the public must see and hear and in a very real sense 
actually join in the deliberations.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ormer United States (“U.S.”) President Bill Clinton’s 
words in response to the thousands of protesters that 
converged on Seattle during the World Trade Organization’s 
(“WTO’s”)2 1999 Ministerial Meeting highlighted an evolving 
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1 See The New Trade War, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://www. 
economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=264372 (describing U.S. President 
Bill Clinton’s comments regarding the protestors during the World Trade 
Organization’s Seattle Ministerial Meeting in 1999). 
 2. See World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
1, 2003) (describing the history of the WTO as a successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)).  The results of the Uruguay 
Round included the modified GATT, as well as two new agreements, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and an Understanding on Dis-
pute Settlement (“DSU”).  Id.  Four principles characterize the cornerstone of 
the WTO: implementation of tariffs through a concession mechanism, elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions, the most favored nation (“MFN”) principle 
and the national treatment of foreign and domestic suppliers.  Id.  The WTO 
is headed by a ministerial meeting of its 145 members (as of February 1, 2003) 
that meets at least once every two years.  Id.  A General Council oversees the 
 
F
File: Jeffords Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  5/19/2003 4:04 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:24 PM 
938 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
systemic issue facing the WTO as well as a shift in the relation-
ship between international institutions, member states, and 
private stakeholders.  This issue is whether and how the WTO 
should consult with non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
and what role these entities should have in the WTO’s function 
as the arbiter of the world trading system.  Resolution of this 
issue will affect the WTO’s efficacy and legitimacy as a global 
institution.  The WTO’s consultation with NGOs also has rami-
fications on the relationship between international institutions 
and individuals.  This issue reflects the shift from the classic 
diplomatic model in which nation states alone have a role in the 
operation of international institutions to a modern model in 
which these institutions consult NGOs to address and to resolve 
issues affecting individuals. 
This shift presents a challenge for the WTO: how can it incor-
porate the viewpoints and interests of non-state actors into the 
institution’s operations?  The presence of the protesters in Seat-
tle had a disastrous effect on the outcome of the Seattle Minis-
terial Meeting, effectively shutting down the negotiations.  
Many of the protesters had purposely gone to Seattle to obstruct 
the negotiation of new trade rules.  Other protesters went to 
Seattle to voice their concerns and opposition to globalization.  
A third group, under the confederation of various NGOs trav-
eled to Seattle in hopes of playing a more important role in the 
trade talks than that of mere observers.  In the end, their pres-
ence challenged the classic legal and diplomatic model of inter-
national relations. 
In the traditional model of international relations, member-
ships of international institutions like the WTO were comprised 
of nation states.  Under this model, governments would attempt 
to bring the varied interests of its citizenry into harmony and 
represented those interests in the international forum.  Non-
state actors such as individuals and NGOs could influence their 
governments’ trade priorities only through domestic processes, 
such as lobbying or petitioning the executive.   
  
ministerial decisions and operates the Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade 
Policy Review Body.  Id.  Reporting to the General Council are the Goods 
Council, the Services Council and the Intellectual Property Council.  Id.  The 
WTO is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and is headed by a Secretariat 
with a 500 person staff.  Id.   
File: Jeffords Base Macro Final.doc Created on: 5/19/2003 4:04 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:24 PM 
2003] THE WTO AND NGOs 939 
However, this model is changing.  While the Agreement Es-
tablishing the WTO provides that only states may be members, 
it also states that the organization may consult with non-state 
actors.  This provision reflects the modern model in which 
NGOs make greater contributions to international institutions.  
To be true to its founding principles, the WTO as an institution 
needs to adopt the modern model by modifying its structure to 
facilitate effective consultation with NGOs. 
This Article argues that the present WTO structure for con-
sultation with NGOs lacks a commitment to utilize NGOs in the 
construction and application of global trade rules that will 
achieve the WTO’s goals.  As compared to other international 
institutions, the WTO does not recognize the increasing impor-
tance of civil society in the functioning of international institu-
tions in the modern era.   
The modern era is one in which individuals are aware of the 
influence of the multilateral trading system.  Since World War 
II, advances in communications and transportation have 
brought the world’s people closer and made them more eco-
nomically interdependent.  The end of World War II brought the 
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”)3 and its successor, the WTO,4 which continues to affect 
the lives of individuals in all states.  The WTO’s rules are bind-
ing on all its member states and often impute obligations on 
non-state actors as well.  Moreover, given the impossibility of 
any state representing all of its domestic interests, non-state 
actors like NGOs arguably should have a stake in the WTO to 
give voice to those unrepresented interests. 
Part II shows that the source of the tension between the WTO 
and NGOs lies in the fact that international law has no uniform 
definition of an NGO.  Further, throughout its history, the WTO 
has been inconsistent in its consideration of the knowledge and 
opinion of NGOs even though the WTO places obligations on 
them.  Despite this inconsistency, the increasing number of 
  
 3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 4. Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement].   
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NGOs participating at the WTO represents an incredibly ar-
rayed force that could either further or hinder the WTO’s goals.   
Building on the history of the WTO and the magnitude of 
NGO interest in influencing the WTO institutionally, Part III of 
this paper focuses on the NGOs’ current attendance at WTO 
ministerial meetings and symposia, as well as the NGOs’ at-
tempts to play a role in dispute resolution at the WTO.  Part IV 
examines the arguments for and against increasing access for 
NGOs at the WTO’s rulemaking and policymaking fora.  While 
these arguments are persuasive, they ignore the number of 
NGOs that are already attending WTO ministerial meetings 
and symposia, and submitting position papers.  Furthermore, 
the arguments against NGO consultation lack merit when the 
WTO’s NGO policy is compared to how other international in-
stitutions consult NGOs on their policy and rulemaking activi-
ties.  These institutions also provide models that the WTO 
might imitate to successfully consult with NGOs on policy and 
rules without impinging upon member states’ rights. 
Part V examines the separate but related issue of NGO par-
ticipation in the WTO’s dispute resolution process.  This Part 
analyzes the unique quality of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
process, which is not found in other international institutions.  
This quality keeps these other institutions from being useful 
models of how the WTO dispute settlement panels might con-
sult with NGOs.  Part VI addresses the sub-issue of whether 
NGOs should be able to bring disputes before WTO panels.  The 
WTO’s structure and procedure for resolving disputes rules out 
the possibility of NGOs being complainants.  However, NGOs do 
have a role in WTO dispute resolution by way of amicus curiae 
briefs.  This part proposes that WTO members create specific 
and tailored rules to seek and welcome amicus briefs to be used 
by the panels to assist in resolving disputes.  
This Article concludes with a summary of recommendations 
for the WTO and its members to consult NGOs in order to ac-
complish the WTO’s mission of improving the world’s living 
standards through fair trade rules. 
II. WHAT IS AN NGO?: A HISTORY 
The first step in analyzing the tension between NGOs and the 
WTO with the goal of proposing a workable solution is to de-
termine the source of the tension.  The current tension between 
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the WTO and NGOs derives from the ambiguous and inconsis-
tent definitions of NGOs used by international institutions and 
the WTO’s reliance on the outdated traditional model of inter-
national relations.  The failure to properly define these influen-
tial non-state actors explains the place NGOs have at the WTO.  
Historically, the treatment of NGOs in the global trading con-
text has not been uniform.  Currently, the WTO limits NGO 
consultation by characterizing the WTO as a government-to-
government institution.  However, the WTO’s short history 
shows that the non-state actor is very interested in and commit-
ted to furthering the WTO’s objectives.  This history and back-
ground of NGOs is only the foundation of this tension, but is 
critical to understanding the problem and to proposing a solu-
tion.  The WTO should adopt a structured consultative proce-
dure to effectuate NGOs’ contributions.   
What exactly is an NGO?  This is not a rhetorical question.  
The term “non-governmental organization” plainly means an 
organization that is not a government organization.5  More pre-
cisely, an NGO is an organization that does not conduct the af-
fairs of a country.6  Specific to the debate about NGOs and the 
WTO, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a non-governmental or-
ganization as, in international law, “any scientific, professional, 
business, or public interest organization that is neither affili-
ated with nor under the direction of a government; an interna-
tional organization that is not the creation of an agreement 
among countries, but rather is composed of private individuals 
or organizations,” which are often granted consultative status 
with the United Nations (“UN”).7  The UN includes NGOs such 
as OPEC, Greenpeace, and the Red Cross.  These definitions 
are relevant because although international law does not con-
sistently define “NGO,”8 international institutions label entities 
  
 5. See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 671 
(1999).   
 6. See id.  See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2001) (argu-
ing that traditional international law posits that States have the exclusive 
right to conduct the affairs of a nation).  See also TERJE TVEDT, ANGELS OF 
MERCY OR DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMATS: NGOS & FOREIGN AID 41 (1998) (theoriz-
ing that NGOs are responses to “market or state failures”).  
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1076–77 (7th ed. 1999). 
 8. See Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and Its Implica-
tions for Equitable Development in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A 
HUMAN FACE 37 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998) (describing how international 
 
File: Jeffords Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  5/19/2003 4:04 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:24 PM 
942 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
as NGOs based on domestic law.9  Naturally, different defini-
tions from diverse legal systems and cultures create challenges 
for international institutions.  In response to the challenge, sev-
eral international institutions and legal scholars have at-
tempted to clarify what type of entity is an NGO, each using 
different classifications.  However, this selection of definitions 
creates ambiguities and misunderstandings about the nature of 
NGOs. 
A definition proposed by the Secretary-General of the UN 
characterizes the trans-border nature of NGOs:   
An NGO is a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or 
associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose ac-
tivities are determined by the collective will of its members in 
response to the needs of the members or of one or more com-
munities with which the NGO cooperates.10 
The Secretary-General’s definition suggests a trans-border 
identity for NGOs, implying that NGOs do not have a national 
identity per se.  While this definition focuses on the geographi-
cal scope of NGOs it does not identify a function for NGOs.  The 
UN Central Evaluation Unit definition addresses this point.  
NGOs are “professional associations, foundations, trade unions 
and business associations as well as research institutes dealing 
with international affairs and associations of parliamentari-
ans.”11  This definition de-emphasizes geography as a feature 
  
law rarely recognized NGOs; rather, an NGO’s juridical status and rights 
were determined by national law). 
 9. See id. at 37.  See also TVEDT, supra note 6, at 13–14.  The United 
States (“U.S.”) defines NGOs according to tax laws.  In the U.S. NGOs are 
defined as “incorporated entities that qualify for exemption from federal in-
come tax under any of the 26 specific subsections of the Internal Revenue 
Code.”  Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, In Search of the Non-Profit 
Sector I: The Question of Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS 125–52 (1992). 
 10. General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-
governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 
1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994).  See also Pe-
ter R. Baehr, Mobilization of the Conscience of Mankind: Conditions of Effec-
tiveness of Human Rights NGOs, in REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
THE LOW COUNTRIES IN HONOUR OF PAUL DE WAART 137 (Erik Denters & Nico 
Shriver eds., 1998).   
 11. See TVEDT, supra note 6, at 13 (agreeing that national law defines an 
entity as an NGO).  Tvedt also comments on the diversity of definitions.  Some 
definitions exclude business and research entities; others exclude trade un-
ions. 
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and is also consistent with Kate Wellard and James Copestake’s 
research, which defines NGOs as “registered, private independ-
ent, non-profit organizations.”12  These definitions individually 
are helpful in determining what types of organizations are per-
ceived to be NGOs.  However, when these three definitions are 
compared, they raise the question of whether NGOs should be 
identified according to their function or geographic location.  
The answer is neither.  To suggest one approach would mini-
mize the importance of the other and possibly exclude legiti-
mate NGOs. 
The research of commentators Lester M. Salamon and 
Helmut K. Anheier supports this point.  Salamon and Anheier 
propose four ways to classify an organization as an NGO.13  The 
first classification is the legal model, which defines NGOs ac-
cording to the laws of a country.14  The second classification is 
the economic/financial model, which requires that an NGO be a 
membership organization with the bulk of its income derived 
from membership dues.15  This model excludes any entity that 
receives more than 50% of its income from government 
sources.16  The third is the functional model, which is a common 
criterion used in the development field.17  The functional model 
looks at an organization’s functions and working methods.18  
Finally, NGOs can be defined using the structural or opera-
tional model, which asserts that an entity’s structure and op-
eration will define it as an NGO.19  An organization will be de-
fined as an NGO under the operational model if: the organiza-
tion is formally constituted, the basic structure is non-
governmental (although government funding is permissible), 
the organization is self-governing, profits are not distributed 
  
 12. See id. (quoting Wellard & Copestake’s research). 
 13. See id. at 14 (quoting Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, In 
Search of the Non-Profit Sector I: The Question of Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS 
125–52 (1992)). 
 14. See id. at 13. 
 15. See id. at 14. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id.  Critics of the functional model cite the model as being difficult 
to apply in different countries at different times because highly normative 
criteria are used.   
 19. See id. at 13 (noting that the structural model was the one which 
Salamon and Anheier preferred). 
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and its membership is to some extent voluntary.20  Salamon and 
Anheier’s broad approach is compatible with the WTO’s broad 
jurisdiction over and goals regarding trade.  This approach also 
reflects the varied types of WTO stakeholders representing the 
global population (including member states and NGOs) and in-
corporates the diplomatic and legal nature of the WTO. 
This collection of definitions highlights the dynamic nature of 
international law and in particular the topic of NGOs’ relation-
ships with international institutions like the WTO.  Since 
World War II, NGOs have increasingly been recognized as le-
gitimate actors in the global arena.21  This increased recognition 
and improved access to decision-makers indicate that interna-
tional law is moving away from the traditional recognition of 
the nation as the supreme player and toward a greater focus on 
individuals.22   
The WTO has no institutional definition to efficiently filter 
stakeholders seeking consultation.  As seen, many definitions 
are available for the WTO to adopt.  Without preferring one 
definition over another, this Article advocates that the WTO 
adopt a definition that will include those stakeholders who can 
help the WTO achieve its mission.  
A. Proposed Role for NGOs at the International Trade  
Organization 
The history of NGOs within the international trade regime is 
complicated.  The WTO’s proposed predecessor — the Interna-
tional Trade Organization (“ITO”)23 — contemplated a consulta-
tive role for NGOs.  Article 87(2) of the ITO’s Charter states 
that: “[The ITO] may make suitable arrangements for consulta-
  
 20. See id. at 15.  The voluntary requirement did not mean its staff was 
required to be volunteers, but that, rather, the board of directors did not re-
ceive compensation. 
 21. See LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A POLITICAL 
DICTIONARY 425 (5th ed. 1995). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 37–38 (2d ed. 2002) 
(detailing the ITO’s history).  The ITO was never created, due in main part to 
the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Havana Charter.  Id. 
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tion and co-operation with non-governmental organizations con-
cerned with matters within the scope of this Charter.”24   
Following the Havana Conference, the parties to the Havana 
Charter established an Interim Commission of the Interna-
tional Trade Organization which focused on the implementation 
of Article 87.25  The outcome of the meeting included a recom-
mendation that the Havana Conference adopt a list of consult-
ants, preferably those NGOs already with consultative status at 
the UN Economic and Social Council.26  These NGOs would be 
observers at the ITO meetings, have access to all Conference 
documentation and have the ability to propose agenda items.27  
At meetings other than the ITO’s Annual Meeting, NGOs with 
competence in a particular subject matter were to be con-
sulted.28  However, the ITO was never established.29  While 
countries negotiating the ITO charter appeared to foresee and 
plan for consultation with NGOs, the ITO’s established succes-
sor, the GATT, included no language providing NGOs with any 
consultative status.   
B. NGOs’ status under the GATT 
It is unclear whether the GATT Secretariat or the Contract-
ing Parties ever granted NGOs consultative status.  During the 
6th Session of the Contracting Parties, the Contracting Parties 
invited representatives from the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) to make statements regarding three resolu-
  
 24. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, art. 87(2), 
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78 (1948), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf 
 25. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCREDITATION SCHEMES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORA 6 (1999), available at http://www. 
ictsd.org/html/accreditation.pdf [hereinafter ICTSD REPORT]. 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.   
 29. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 76 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the co-existence of the 
GATT and the proposed ITO).  The GATT was intended to address tariffs 
while the ITO would be an institution like the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.  Id. 
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tions.30  Despite this invitation, it seems that the ICC represen-
tatives never did address the Contracting Parties because a 
later note from the GATT Secretariat’s Office indicated that no 
NGO had ever been admitted as an observer to any of the GATT 
working party sessions.31  The Secretariat’s note also concluded 
that no NGO had ever obtained consultative status.32  This 
clouded history illuminates the current status of NGOs at the 
WTO. 
C. Current status of NGOs at the WTO 
Article V(2) of the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization states: “The General Council may make appropri-
ate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to 
those of the WTO.”33  The Agreement distinguishes between non-
governmental organizations and other intergovernmental or-
ganizations.34  Specifically, the WTO’s General Council is re-
quired to make appropriate arrangements for cooperation with 
other intergovernmental organizations with similar responsi-
bilities to the WTO.35  Conversely, the General Council has the 
discretion to consult and cooperate with NGOs on WTO-related 
concerns.36  The WTO Agreement gives NGOs obligations in two 
sub-agreements, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
(“TBT Agreement”)37 and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”).38   
These two agreements include NGOs within their scope.  The 
TBT Agreement requires members to ensure that NGOs, cen-
  
 30. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 1043 
(6th ed. 1994). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. WTO Agreement art. V, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 34. See id.   
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. ¶ 2. 
 37. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement Annex 1A, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/UR/FA/17-tbt.doc [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 38. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex 1A, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/UR/FA/15-sps.doc [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
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tral or national governments, and local governments all follow 
the same obligations to set and monitor standards.39  The TBT 
Agreement’s Annex I defines a non-governmental body as a 
“body other than a central government body or a local govern-
ment body, including a non-governmental body which has the 
legal power to enforce a technical regulation.”40  The SPS 
Agreement also contains a requirement that WTO members 
ensure compliance with the SPS Agreement by non-
governmental bodies.41  The inclusion of NGOs in the text of 
these agreements and the imputation of obligations upon them 
provides some justification for NGOs’ demand for more effective 
consultation.42 
  
 39. See TBT Agreement arts. 3, 8.  Specifically, Article 3.1 of the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”) requires WTO mem-
bers to take reasonable measures to ensure that NGOs comply with the TBT 
Agreement’s Article 2, which creates obligations for central governments 
when adopting technical regulations and standards.  Article 8 also requires 
members to ensure that NGOs’ conformity assessment procedures comply 
with those required of the central government.  This provision also highlights 
the role of state and local governments in the WTO.  While this is similar to 
the NGO issue, it is more complicated given the definition of federalism in the 
United States.  However, as the accompanying database reveals sub-federal 
entities have attended and participated as NGOs in the WTO. 
 40. See id. Annex 1, ¶ 8.  
 41. See SPS Agreement art. 13. 
 42. See TERRENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING 
HISTORY (1986–1992), at 1068–77 (1993) (describing the history of the Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade Agreement).  During the GATT, contracting parties 
signed on to a Standards Code that applied to standards developed by NGOs.  
The European Community sought to require contracting parties to agree to 
use best practices to ensure that NGOs comply with the GATT’s Standards 
Code.  To this extent the TBT and the Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) can be construed as 
obligating NGOs.  As WTO members are bound by the TBT and SPS Agree-
ments to insure compliance by NGOs, NGOs will be bound by their national 
governments to adhere to the TBT and SPS Agreements.  Since no WTO 
member can opt out of the SPS or TBT Agreement, any measure taken by an 
NGO must comply with the TBT and SPS Agreements. 
  Obligations are imputed to NGOs because NGO status is determined 
by national law; NGOs that place a WTO member at risk of violating a WTO 
obligation will face discipline in the domestic setting.  See CASSESE, supra note 
6, at 78 (setting out the traditional position of international law under inter-
national agreements can not create direct rights and obligations for individu-
als).  However, international agreements may oblige the contracting parties to 
adopt rules creating individual rights and obligations which are enforceable in 
national courts.  Id.  Cassese later demonstrates that, under modern interna-
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Reading the TBT and SPS Agreements together with Article 
V suggests that consultation between NGOs and the WTO is 
necessary to effectuate these agreements despite Article V’s dis-
cretionary language.  However, the WTO sees itself as a gov-
ernment-to-government institution.43  Consultation with NGOs 
is thus limited and subject to members’ discretion, which 
threatens a productive relationship between the WTO and 
NGOs.44   
The variety of definitions of NGOs’ rights and duties further 
shows that the meaning of the term NGO is unclear.  The WTO 
treaty language also appears ambiguous if not contradictory 
regarding the level of consultation between the WTO and 
NGOs.  In response to criticism from NGOs regarding the in-
terpretation of Article V, the WTO’s General Council directed 
the Secretariat to issue the Guidelines for Arrangements on 
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (“The Guide-
lines”).45  The Guidelines recognize that NGOs have a role in the 
WTO.46  They also state that the WTO is committed to improv-
ing communication between NGOs and the WTO.47  The Guide-
lines further contend that the WTO intends to become a more 
transparent institution by publicizing formerly restricted 
  
tional law, states have lost their exclusive power over individuals.  Id. at 79.  
Individuals as “holders of internationally material interests” have been 
“granted legal rights which are operational at the international level.” Id.  
States have extended their international obligations to take into account indi-
viduals’ demands, concerns and conduct.  Id.  See also Marsha A. Echols, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
207 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996) (arguing that the Committee on SPS 
Measures should have a close relationship with NGOs because in many cases 
NGOs are able to implement SPS obligations). 
 43. See WTO Agreement art. V, ¶¶ 1–2.  Although the Agreement does not 
specifically state that only sovereign states can be members of the WTO, this 
principle is based on the specific language characterizing NGOs as distinct 
from WTO members and intergovernmental organizations. See, e.g., WTO 
Agreement, Annex on Telecommunications, ¶ 7(b) (granting Members discre-
tion to consult with NGOs). 
 44. See id. art. V, ¶ 2.  The language here is the discretionary “may” rather 
than the mandatory “shall” of Article V, Paragraph 1. 
 45. See GATT Secretariat, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with 
Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, (adopted July 18, 1996), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm [hereinafter 
Guidelines on NGOs]. 
 46. See id. ¶ II. 
 47. See id.  
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documents more quickly.48  The Secretariat is tasked with de-
veloping a closer relationship with NGOs through ad hoc sym-
posia, NGO-initiated briefings, and a mechanism, not then de-
termined, which would disseminate information to delegations 
interested in that information.49  The Guidelines state that any 
WTO Council or Committee Chair that met with NGOs did so in 
an individual, not an official capacity.50  The Guidelines also 
emphasize that the WTO was an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, which prohibited NGOs from being directly involved in the 
WTO’s day-to-day work.51  The Guidelines recommend that 
NGOs work in closer cooperation and consultation with member 
states at the national level because nation states had the re-
sponsibility to formulate trade policy.52   
Unfortunately these Guidelines do not clarify the meaning of 
Article V.  Rather, they seem to isolate the member states from 
NGOs’ input by directing the Secretariat to issue the Guide-
lines, which govern the relationship between NGOs and the 
WTO, but which were themselves created without input from 
NGOs.   
Understandably, NGOs consider the Guidelines unsatisfac-
tory.  First, the Guidelines task the Secretariat with maintain-
ing relations with NGOs while Article V empowers the General 
Council to consult with NGOs.53  The Guidelines shield WTO 
members from interaction with NGOs, but it is the WTO mem-
bers, not the Secretariat that negotiate the trade agreements.54  
  
 48. See id. ¶ III. 
 49. See id. ¶ IV. 
 50. See id. ¶ V. 
 51. See id. ¶ VI. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See WTO Agreement art. V, ¶ 2. 
 54. Id. art. IV (describing the General Council as the architect of the nego-
tiating process).  See also id. art. IV, ¶ 2 (describing the General Council as 
comprised of representatives from WTO member states); id. art. VI (describ-
ing the functions of the Secretariat).  The Secretariat is international in na-
ture and its duties and functions come from the Ministerial Conference.  Id.  
Arguably, the issuance of the Guidelines outside of a Ministerial Meeting 
usurps the power of the General Council because the Ministerial Meeting 
delegates are the same as the General Council.  Id. art. IX (describing the 
decision–making practices of the WTO).  Only WTO members, not the Secre-
tariat, are empowered to make decisions that affect the operation of the WTO.  
Id. 
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Thus, NGOs have no way of contributing to the negotiation of 
trade agreements.  The Guidelines are correct that nation 
states negotiate trade policy, but the WTO was created to bene-
fit all of the world’s people,55 many of whom are able to speak 
only through NGOs.   
Following the 1996 adoption of the Guidelines, the WTO for-
mulated a procedure for organizations to attend the Singapore 
Ministerial Meeting.56  NGOs were permitted to attend Plenary 
Meetings of the Singapore Meeting provided the WTO Secre-
tariat accepted their applications.57  According to Article V, 
drafted to regulate how applications were to be accepted, an 
NGO must show their activities “were concerned with matters 
related to those at the WTO.”58  In preparation for the Cancún 
Ministerial in September 2003, WTO members adopted differ-
ent registration procedures for NGOs to attend the Fifth Minis-
terial.59  NGOs are directed to file their requests to register and 
to provide in detail how their NGO is “concerned with matters 
related to those of the WTO.”60  Registration requests will be 
coordinated through the External Relations Division, which is a 
part of the WTO’s Secretariat.61     
III. THE STATUS OF NGOS AT THE WTO 
Judging from the number of position papers and amicus 
briefs submitted by NGOs and NGO attendance at WTO minis-
terial meetings and symposia, it is clear that NGOs are deter-
  
 55. See id. at pmbl. (recognizing that the activities of the WTO are in-
tended to raise living standards, to ensure full employment and to expand the 
production of and trade in goods at the same time, and to allow for the optimal 
use of the world’s resources). 
 56. See World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations/Civil Society, at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ 
intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2003). 
 57. See generally World Trade Organization, WTO Secretariat activities 
with NGOs, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01 
_ngo_activ_e.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).  
 58. See id. 
 59. World Trade Organization, Registration for Non-Governmental Organi-
zations, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/ngo_ 
acc_e.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003). 
 60. Id.   
 61. Id.   
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mined to have a formal and uniform consultative role at the 
WTO despite the Guidelines’ limitations. 
A review of the number of NGOs involved with the WTO con-
firms existing conclusions and reveals the evolution of the role 
of NGOs in the WTO. 
More than 1,490 NGOs have had some interaction with the 
WTO62 most of which are from Europe and North America.63  Of 
that total, approximately 495 come from North America and 
555 from Europe.64  Before analyzing NGOs participation at the 
WTO, it is helpful to first understand global trade flows.  The 









 62. The author compiled a database tracking every NGO that has been 
listed as a registrant in a WTO activity or submitted a position paper through 
February 2003 or has submitted an amicus brief through May 15, 2002 [here-
inafter NGO Database].   
  The NGO Database organizes NGOs by country and groups them by 
region.  The regional categories are: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Australia-New Zea-
land, Central & Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin & 
South America, and North America.  The opportunities listed are broken out 
into three categories: (1) Ministerial Meetings; (2) Symposia and Position Pa-
pers; and (3) Amicus Brief Submissions.  These three categories are further 
divided.  In the Ministerial Meeting category, attendance is tracked for Doha, 
Seattle, the Fiftieth Anniversary in Geneva and Singapore.  The Symposia 
and Position Papers category tracks NGOs attending the Trade and Develop-
ment Symposia with United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTD”), the Trade and Environment Symposia, the Symposia with Civil 
Society and Position Papers.  The Amicus Brief section tracks those NGOs 
which have submitted amicus briefs to panels by those briefs which panels 
have considered and those briefs which panels did not consider.  Approxi-
mately fifteen NGOs were not able to be located in terms of their home coun-
try.  The source of the information is the WTO’s website.  The database is on 
file with author and all questions should be directed to her. 
 63. NGO Database. 
 64. Id. 
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Figure 1: Global Trade Flows, 1995–200065 




















 65. See WTO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2002 (2002), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/its2002_e.pdf. 
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As Figure 1 shows, the majority of trade occurs between de-
veloped countries.  However, the trade flow data demonstrates 
an overall increase in trade globally.  Since the WTO was estab-
lished, NGOs have had at least eight Article V consultations 
with the WTO, have had opportunities to submit amicus briefs 
in over 250 disputes, and have had unlimited opportunities to 
submit position papers.66  Only one NGO, the ICC, achieved the 
highest possible score, a nine, and only two NGOs — the World 
Wide Fund for Nature and Greenpeace — have achieved a score 
of eight.67  Using four as the median score, eighty-five NGOs 
scored above the median.68  Six NGOs had a score of seven; eight 
with the score of six and twenty-two and forty-six with scores of 
five and four respectively.  The highest score for an NGO from a 
developing country was a seven for the Consumer Unity and 
Trust Society of India.  Breaking down the NGOs with a score of 
four or better by region, approximately fifty-two are from West-
ern Europe, twenty are from North America, ten are from Asia-
Pacific, three are from Africa, and none are from Central and 
Eastern Europe, Latin and South America, the Middle East, or 
Australia/New Zealand.  These numbers also show that NGOs 
from Europe participated on average 1.9 times, and surpris-
ingly, that NGOs from North America participated on average 
1.52 times.69   
Facts behind the numbers demonstrate that location of a 
meeting or symposia influences the NGOs involved.  Those 
meetings held in Europe naturally attract NGOs from Europe 
while the Seattle Ministerial was overwhelmingly attended by 
  
 66. See NGO Database.  NGOs consultations with the WTO during minis-
terial meetings, symposia, position papers, and amicus briefs were calculated 
to determine a score for comparative purposes.  As of March 2003, ten oppor-
tunities arose for NGOS to be consulted by the WTO.  These opportunities 
consisted of four ministerial meetings, four public symposia, and the unlim-
ited opportunities to submit position papers and amicus briefs determined by 
the number of disputes.  Opportunities to submit position papers and amicus 
briefs were classified into one category for each.  Adding the four ministerial 
meetings, position papers, and amicus briefs, ten is the minimum achievable 
benchmark score.  
 67. See id.  
 68. See id. 
 69. See id.  
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NGOs from North America and predictably so will the Cancún 
Ministerial.70 
 





















Figure 2 provides the overall level of NGO participation at 
the four ministerial meetings.  More than 425 NGOs attended 
the 2001 Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar as compared to 
the approximately 830 at the Seattle Ministerial, 145 at the 
Geneva 50th Anniversary of the GATT celebration and 115 at 
the Singapore Ministerial.71   
 
  
 70. See id. 
 71. See Figure 2. 
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(through February 2003) 
 
Figure 3 illustrates NGO attendance at four symposia held in 
Geneva, Switzerland: Trade and the Environment (123 NGOs), 
Trade and Development (31 NGOs), Symposium on Issues Con-
fronting the World Trading System (244 NGOs) and the most 
recently the Doha Development Agenda and Civil Society (355 
NGOs).72  NGOs have also submitted position papers,73 attended 
scheduled briefings related to the WTO’s day-to-day work, and 
met informally with the Secretariat staff and WTO members’ 




 72. See Figure 3. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See WTO, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: NGO Attendance (Apr. 12, 
2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_/min01_ngo_ 
activ_e.htm.  
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Figure 5: NGO Submissions to Panels — Amicus Curiae75  
Submissions 
 
WTO Dispute NGO Submitting Action by Panel or  
Appellate Body 
Collegium Ramazzini 
American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations 
(2) 
The Panel took the brief into 
consideration because the 
briefs were incorporated into 
the European Communities 
brief. 
Ban Asbestos Network 
Institutor Mexicano de 
Fibro-Industrias A.C.(2) 
The Panel did not take into 
consideration but did not cite 
a reason. 





Only Nature Endures (1) The Panel did not consider 
this brief because it was 
submitted too far into the 
panel process. 
EC — Antidumping 
Duties on Cotton 
Type Bed Linen 
from India, 
WT/DS/141/R:Panel 
Report (Oct. 30, 
2000) 
Foreign Trade Admini-
stration submitted by Dr. 
Konrad Neundorfer (1) 
Brief was circulated to the 
EC and India to make com-
ments.  Neither party made 
comments, so the Panel did 
not take the brief into con-
sideration when it decided 
the case. 
  
 75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999) (defining  amicus curiae, 
“Latin for ‘friend of the court,’ a person who is not a party to a law suit but 
who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action 
because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter”).  In The 
United States Supreme Court case Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908), 
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, then a prominent Boston at-
torney, filed a brief on behalf of the State of Oregon in defense of Oregon’s 
statute limiting women factory worker’s days to ten or less hours on the 
grounds that the law protected women’s health.  The significance of the 
“Brandeis Brief” was that it devoted two pages to legal arguments and more 
than one hundred pages to sociological, economic, and physiological data on 
the effect of long working hours on women’s health.  This brief set a model for 
future briefs that would be used to present historical, sociological, scientific, 
economic and other non-legal information to courts to assist in judicial deci-
sion making.  See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs, Backgrounder on the Court Opinion on the Muller v. Oregon 
Case, at http://exchanges.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/AmLnC/ 
br30.htm. 
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(June 15, 2001) 
Earth Justice Legal De-
fense Fund on behalf of 
the Turtle Island Restora-
tion Network, the Hu-
mane Society of the 
United States, the Ameri-
can Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to 
Animals, Defenders of 
Wildlife, and the Fiscalia 
Del Medio Ambiente 
(Chile). (6) 
The National Wildlife 
Federation on behalf of 
the Center for Marine 
Conservation, Centro 
Ecoceanos, Defenders of 
Wildlife, Friends of the 
Earth, Kenya Sea Turtle 
Committee, Marine Tur-
tle Preservation Group of 
India, National Wildlife 
Federation, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 
Operation Kachhapa, 
Project Swarajya, 
Visakha Society for Pre-
vention of Cruelty to 
Animals (11) 
The United States decided to 
attach the National Wildlife 
Federation brief to its sub-
mission in this case. The 
United States argued that 
the Earthjustice Submission 
did not appear to be as rele-
vant to the issues in this 
dispute as it addressed a 
hypothetical issue that was 
not before the Panel. The 
United States noted, how-
ever, that the Panel had the 
discretion to accept the 
Earthjustice Submission 
directly from the submitters. 
The Panel considered those 
NGO arguments attached to 




dumping Duties on 




(Apr. 11, 2001) 
Consumer Industries 
Trade Action Coalition 
(CITAC), based in the US 
(1) 
The Brief was returned be-
cause it contained evidence 
that CITAC had obtained 
confidential information con-
tained in Thailand’s submis-
sion.  Poland and CITAC 
were represented by the 




(Mar. 12, 2001) 
 Appellate Body met en banc 
and added Rule 16.1 to its 
Working Procedures to facili-
tate the submission of briefs 
from NGOs.  Procedure was 
for this case only and was not 
a new procedure under Rule 
17.9 of the DSU.76 
  
 76. See Additional Procedure Adopted under Rule 16(1) of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities — Measures Affect-
ing Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000) 
 
File: Jeffords Base Macro Final.doc Created on: 5/19/2003 4:04 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:24 PM 




States); HVL Asbestos 
(Swaziland) Limited 
(Bulembu Mine); South 
African Asbestos Produc-
ers Advisory Committee 
(South Africa); J & S Bri-
dle Associates (United 
Kingdom); Associacao das 
Industrias de Produtos de 
Amianio Crisotilo (Portu-
gal);Asbestos Cement 
Industries Limited (Sri 
Lanka); The Federation of 
Thai Industries, Roofing 
and Accessories Club 
(Thailand); Korea Asbes-
tos Association (Korea); 
Senac (Senegal); Syndicat 
des Metallos (Canada); 
Duralita de Cen-
troamerica, S.A. de C.V. 
(El Salvador); Asociacion 
Colombiana de Fibras 




Briefs were returned to the 
NGOs because they were not 
submitted in accordance with 
the adopted procedure.  The 
Appellate Body included with 
the returned brief a letter 
detailing the process for 
seeking leave.  Only one, 
Korea Asbestos filed for leave 
to submit a brief under the 
procedure detailed. 
Association of Personal 
Injury Lawyers (United 








Asbestos Cement Pipe 
Manufacturers’ Associa-
tion (India); Roofit Indus-
tries Ltd. (India); and 
Society for Occupational 
Applications from these 
groups were received by the 
Division after the deadline 
specified in the Additional 
Procedure for receipt of such 
application. 
  
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135-9.doc. 
[hereinafter Asbestos Additional Procedure].  This procedure could form the 
basis of a criteria for dispute settlement panels to consult with NGOs.   
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and Environmental 
Health (United States). 
(6) 
 
Professor Robert Lloyd 
Howse (United States); 
Occupational & Environ-
mental Diseases Associa-
tion (United Kingdom); 
American Public Health 
Association (United 
States); Centro de Estu-
dios Comunitarios de la 
Universidad Nacional de 
Rosario (Argentina); Only 
Nature Endures (India); 
Korea Asbestos Associa-
tion (Korea); Interna-
tional Council on Metals 
and the Environment and 
American Chemistry 
Council (United States); 
European Chemical In-
dustry Council (Belgium); 
Australian Centre for 
Environmental Law at 
the Australian National 
University (Australia); 
Associate Professor Jan 
McDonald and Mr. Don 
Anton (Australia); and a 
joint application from 
Foundation for Environ-
mental Law and Devel-
opment (United King-





(United Kingdom), Ban 
Asbestos International 
and Virtual Network 
(France), Greenpeace 
International (The 
Netherlands), World Wide 
Fund for Nature, Interna-
tional (Switzerland), and 
Lutheran World Federa-
tion (Switzerland). (17) 
These applications were re-
ceived by the Division within 
the deadline specified in the 
Additional Procedure for 
receipt of such applications 
but were denied because they 
did not comply with ¶ 3 of 
the Additional Procedures. 
US: Countervailing 
Duties on Hot 
Rolled Lead & 
American I on and Steel 
Institute, Specialty Steel 
Institute of North Amer-
The Appellate Body ruled 
that it had the legal author-
ity to accept amicus briefs.  
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Bismuth Carbon 




ica (2) However, it was unnecessary 
in this case. 
 






(Oct. 12, 1998) 
Group 1: Earth Island 
Institute/Humane Society 
of US/Sierra Club (3) 
Group 2: Center for In-
ternational Environ-






Network/Red Nacional de 
Accion Ecologica/ 
Sobrevivencia (7) 
Group 3: Worldwide Fund 
for Nature/Foundation for 
International Environ-
mental Law and Devel-
opment (2) 
 
The Appellate Body ruled 
that the panel made a flawed 
legal interpretation that 
panels had no authority to 
accept unsolicited informa-
tion from non-governmental 
bodies.  The Appellate Body 
also held that Articles 13 and 
12.1 empowered a panel to 
modify its procedures after 
consulting with the parties to 
solicit information from non-
governmental entities.  The 
AB upheld the panel’s rejec-
tion of the briefs because as 
panels could seek informa-
tion from any source; they 
also could reject it.   
 
Throughout the history of dispute settlement at the WTO, 
more than seventy NGOs have submitted amicus curiae briefs 
either to dispute panels or the Appellate Body.77  Most of these 
briefs have not been considered by panels or the Appellate Body 
as independent submissions, unless they were included in a 
party’s submission.  However, in the EC—Asbestos case,78 de-
spite criticism from many WTO members,79 the Appellate Body 
  
 77. This number is based on references to NGO submissions by panels and 
the Appellate Body in WTO opinions. The number is probably a conservative 
estimate.  See Andrea K. Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief 
Battle at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 96 (2001) (describing NGO sub-
missions to panels that had been rejected automatically; however, in the cases 
she cites, there are no mention of these submissions by the panels). 
 78. The World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on European 
Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts § 52, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135-11.doc [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body 
Report]. 
 79. See India Protests at WTO Appellate Body Move Inviting Amicus Briefs, 
M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29588646 [hereinafter 
India Protests]. 
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sought amicus briefs, as a procedural matter.  The disagree-
ment among WTO members and between the members and the 
Appellate Body demonstrates that vague rules on NGO consul-
tation create tensions, particularly when the Appellate Body is 
perceived to have created a new right for itself.  This debate 
also demonstrates that the role of NGO at the WTO has been 
evolving in an unforeseen way because WTO members have not 
addressed this issue.   
The Appellate Body’s request for amicus briefs in the EC—
Asbestos case appears more hortatory than substantive because 
they did not influence the Appellate Body’s final ruling.  Never-
theless it is significant because of the attention it draws to this 
unresolved issue.  The issue presented here is not whether 
NGOs have a role at the WTO, but rather how NGOs can be 
consulted in a way that is meaningful but does not impinge 
upon any participating member’s rights in WTO dispute resolu-
tions. 
The role of NGOs in the multilateral trading arena from the 
proposed ITO through the provisional GATT, and up to today’s 
WTO has not kept apace with the increasing recognition that 
international institutions must connect to individuals not only 
through member governments but also through NGOs.  While 
effectuating NGO consultation is not on the WTO’s official pri-
ority list, the issue is constantly being debated.  This debate, if 
left unresolved, has the potential to hamstring the WTO’s effi-
cient advancement of liberalized trade rules.80  This history ar-
guably shows that this topic is a controversial one that requires 
attention. 
  
 80. See Fiona McGillivray, Democratizing the World Trade Organization, 
in HOOVER INSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY NO. 105, HOOVER 
INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE 1, 2 (2000).  See also JACKSON, 
supra note 23, at 61.  Efficient advancement of trade rules refers to the con-
sensus-based model of decision-making at the WTO.  Relative to other inter-
national institutions, the WTO is efficient in that all members are required to 
adopt the WTO Agreements as a package.  No cherry picking of agreements is 
permitted.  Id. 
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IV. THE DEBATE  
A. Three Points of View 
The WTO’s official position is that it is an intergovernmental 
organization that operates diplomatically.  Granting NGOs 
greater involvement could potentially impede the diplomatic 
process because they work through domestic processes to influ-
ence global trade policy.81  However, this presupposes that every 
WTO member has a transparent and effective process.  The 
WTO’s position also assumes that governments incorporate ad-
versarial points of view into a member state’s WTO trade pol-
icy.82  The WTO’s official position neglects the fact that, despite 
its claim to be a strictly government-to-government organiza-
tion, the WTO requires global support for it to be effective.83  
The WTO faces constant scrutiny as its events and happenings 
are beamed instantly around the globe via satellite or transmit-
ted over the Internet with a click of a mouse. 
WTO members claim that the WTO already enjoys popular 
support because its representatives are democratically elected, 
whereas NGOs are not.84  WTO members claim that this em-
powers them to negotiate rules, later to be ratified in national 
legislatures around the world.85  For this reason WTO members 
often repeat the WTO’s official position that NGOs should work 
through domestic processes.86  WTO members further justify 
  
 81. See Guidelines on NGOs, supra note 45, ¶ VI.  
 82. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2154 (2000) (requiring the 
President of the U.S. to consult with the private and non-Federal government 
when negotiating trade agreements).  But see Gary P. Sampson, The Envi-
ronmentalist Paradox: The World Trade Organization’s Challenges, 23 HARV. 
INT’L REV. 56, 58 (2002) (suggesting governments do not satisfy every domestic 
interest especially in the course of negotiations where bargaining results in 
trade-offs).   
 83. See TOMAS LARSSON, THE RACE TO THE TOP: THE REAL STORY OF 
GLOBALIZATION 34 (2001). 
 84. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 2–3. 
 85. See Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Non-governmental Interests, 
24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 173, 197 (2000). 
 86. See id. at 197 (describing the WTO members’ viewpoints as a statist 
perspective).  According to the statist perspective, because the WTO is com-
posed of member states, NGOs have no place of their own and must rely on 
their domestic governments to influence the WTO’s agenda.  Id.  However, 
according to the individualist perspective, “as an agency of global governance, 
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their refusal to consult with NGOs by claiming WTO negotia-
tions are analogous to legislatures or Cabinet advisors who fre-
quently meet behind closed doors.87  The WTO, they argue, 
should not be forced to do what its member states are not.88 
WTO members further justify their refusal to consult NGOs 
by arguing that many NGOs have a propensity towards violence 
and disrupting WTO proceedings.89  Consequently, NGOs who 
are genuinely interested in the WTO are suspected of attempt-
ing to use this interest to mask a hidden anti-WTO or anti-
globalization agenda.90  WTO members suspect that NGOs are 
attempting to force the WTO to address issues outside of the 
institution’s competence.91  Some WTO members believe NGO 
consultation will result in special interests dominating the 
WTO agenda over the members’ interests.92 
While the viewpoints of all WTO members are essential to 
this debate, developing countries are especially concerned about 
this issue.  Developing countries, which perceive NGOs to be a 
well-funded European and North American export,93 fear that 
NGO consultation will dilute their WTO membership rights.94  
Many developing countries also lack the resources necessary to 
fully participate at the WTO and believe that NGOs that do 
have these resources will impinge upon developing countries’ 
  
the WTO should maintain a vital connection to individuals who inhabit the 
planet.”  Id. at 202. 
 87. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 2. 
 88. See id.  See also HETTY KOVACH ET AL., THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT:  POWER WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY? 8 (2003), available at 
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/Files/Pubs/GAP%20report/GAP2003.pdf.  This 
is a pilot report of an on-going research project on the issue of global account-
ability.  The report evaluated inter-governmental organizations, transnational 
corporations and non-governmental organizations on two aspects of account-
ability: member control and access to information.  The WTO scored high 
among the five international inter-governmental organizations studied.  Un-
deniably the WTO’s dissemination of information is good once the information 
is derestricted.  However, the study emphasizes that WTO members,  nation–
states, and customs territories control the organization. Id. 
 89. WTO Conferences are marred by antiglobalization protesters, rallied 
by NGOs.  The NGOs seeking constructive reform resent violence being asso-
ciated with their cause.  See ECONOMIST, supra note 1.   
 90. See TVEDT, supra note 6. 
 91. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 3. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100. 
 94. See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 210. 
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rights as WTO members.95  As shown above, most NGOs are in 
fact from Europe or North America, and so these fears may hold 
a glimmer of truth. 
The reasons put forward to limit NGO consultation are con-
vincing when viewed under the traditional international legal 
model.  However, this model ignores the instability and ineffi-
ciency that occurs when non-state viewpoints are ignored.96  
This model also neglects the fact that while the WTO was origi-
nally concerned solely with the reduction of tariffs, it has 
shifted its focus to creating standards for domestic regulations 
and their enforcement.97  The traditional model of international 
law assumes state competence in all international law matters, 
including international trade relationships.  This assumption 
has become less true especially since the Cold War’s end, as the 
world has seen many governments’ inability, indifference, or 
failure to satisfy the demands of their citizens.98  Because of the 
WTO’s connection to and impact on individuals, NGOs should 
have a greater voice. 
NGOs deserve an effective and real consultative role at the 
WTO.  NGOs can assist developing countries maximize their 
power in the WTO and provide technical knowledge, scientific 
or other expert advice99 that would assist the WTO members in 
negotiating rules in areas like environmental policy, invest-
  
 95. See id. at 211 (stating that many WTO members oppose NGOs because 
the presence of NGOs in the WTO arena waters down governments’ status as 
official representatives).  See Interview with Stephen Porter, Counsel, Center 
for International Environmental Law, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 2002) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Porter Interview] (distinguishing NGOs with 
resources from NGOs with little resources to dominate the WTO’s agenda).   
 96. See generally JANET THOMAS, THE BATTLE IN SEATTLE: THE STORY 
BEHIND AND BEYOND THE WTO DEMONSTRATIONS (2000) (chronicling the vari-
ous NGO groups and individuals present at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting).  
See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 205–06.  See also LAWRENCE T. WOODS, ASIA-
PACIFIC DIPLOMACY: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 25 (1993) (seeing NGOs as evolving actors in diplomacy). 
 97. See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
451, 457 (2001).  See also Wolfgang Benedek, Relations of the WTO with other 
International Organizations and NGOs, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
WITH A HUMAN FACE 492 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998).   
 98. ZIRING ET AL., supra note 21. 
 99. See WTO, WTO Assistance for Developing Countries, at 
www.wto.org/english/trawp_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003). 
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ment, intellectual property and competition.100  Considering 
NGO advice would add much-needed transparency and legiti-
macy to the WTO.101  Even if WTO members decided to disre-
gard NGOs’ advice, WTO negotiations would still be more le-
gitimate if an effective consultation framework was in place. 
In conclusion, the main justification for NGO participation is 
that global society has become more connected in economic rela-
tions as a result of the organized multilateral trading system.102  
The multilateral trading system has advanced the liberalization 
of transportation and communications networks103 and played a 
key role in political liberalization.104  As a result, individuals can 
know in real time when proposed trade rules or decisions will 
affect them.105 
In the fifty years of its evolution, the multilateral trading sys-
tem has seen a tremendous change in the way states and gov-
ernments relate.  The classical international legal theory, which 
regarded only states as actors in international law, has trans-
formed into a model recognizing that NGOs and other non-state 
actors are legitimate actors in international law.  Non-state ac-
tors in some instances have more power and ability to influence 
decisions than small nation states like Haiti or the Federated 
States of Micronesia.106  Developing countries not present during 
the original ITO negotiations now comprise a majority of WTO 
  
 100. See Sampson, supra note 82, at 57. 
 101. See James P. Durling, Rights of Access to WTO Dispute Settlement, in 
DUE PROCESS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 141, 154–55 (Phillippe Ruttley et 
al. eds., 2001). 
 102. See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 7. 
 103. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE 1–26 (1997). 
 104. See Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trad-
ing System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 L. & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 205, 213.  See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 7. 
 105. See, e.g., LARSSON, supra note 83, at 10 (discussing how the Internet 
and technology has advanced the flow of information, in particular to the de-
veloping world).  See also CAIRNCROSS, supra note 103, at ch. 10 (describing 
how technology once thought of as a means for government to monitor its citi-
zens in an Orwellian sense actually has become a way for citizens to hold their 
governments accountable through effective communications between citizen 
and government and among citizens). 
 106. See Harold Hongju, Transnational Legal Practice, in THE NATURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (Gerry Simpson ed., 2001). 
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members.107  Individuals are no longer at arm’s length regarding 
trade rule negotiation and application.108  While the WTO seems 
not to have acknowledged this change in the global legal re-
gime, other international institutions have acknowledged and 
embraced this change.109  These institutions provide useful mod-
els for the WTO to study, in deciding how they might consult 
NGOs in rulemaking and policymaking. 
B. How Other International Institutions Can Provide Examples 
Of How NGOs Can Be Consulted In Negotiation and Rule-
making without Infringing Member States’ Rights. 
Were the WTO to effectively consult with NGOs, it would not 
be alone among international institutions.  Other international 
institutions provide examples of how successful consultation 
with NGOs can be permitted without lessening the rights of 
member states in the institution.  These institutions demon-
strate that the traditional model of international relations is 
not the only available model in the 21st century.  Although many 
multilateral organizations consult NGOs,110 at least a dozen in-
ternational institutions provide workable and acceptable mod-
els for the WTO to analyze and to emulate for effective NGO 
consultation.  These institutions are similar to the WTO in 
terms of their membership size and scope of activities and in-
clude official UN agencies, global economic institutions, and 
international institutions whose missions require interaction 
with NGO stakeholders in the corporate, environment and labor 
areas.  The WTO thus appears to fall behind its peer institu-
tions when it comes to consultation with NGOs.   
  
 107. See generally GATT.  See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 319–20 (de-
scribing the dissatisfaction that many Latin American counties had with the 
GATT negotiated in 1947, and viewing the GATT as a disadvantage to devel-
oping countries, several Latin American countries having either never joined 
the GATT or having delayed joining).  The original signatories were Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
and the U.S.  See GATT.   
 108. See Durling, supra note 101, at 141. 
 109. See infra part B.  
 110. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
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1. UN Agencies 
The UN has the same members as the WTO, focuses on glob-
ally scoped issues and faces the same logistical challenges in 
negotiations.111  UN agencies consult with NGOs as is appropri-
ate for the particular NGO’s size, function, and scope.112  This 
tiered structure is flexible enough to allow NGO consultation in 
the negotiating forum or in only the preparatory work to the 
negotiations.   
Article 71 of the UN Charter grants the Economic and Social 
Council (“ECOSOC”) the discretion to consult with NGOs.113  
The ECOSOC has developed a hierarchical status to facilitate 
NGO consultation: An NGO may be placed on the general, spe-
cific, or roster status.114  An accreditation process managed by 
the Committee for NGOs, comprised of nineteen UN member 
states, determines which NGOs are placed on which roster.115  
  
 111. See id. at 7–18. 
 112. See generally id. at 8. 
 113. U.N. CHARTER art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make 
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations 
which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements 
may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with 
national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Na-
tions concerned.”). 
 114. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 8 (describing the ECOSOC 
framework as broken down into three categories).  General status is granted 
to those NGOs concerned with ECOSOC’s activities.  NGOs in this category 
are those large NGOs with a broad geographical reach.  Special status is the 
second category and may be granted to those NGOs with a special competence 
specifically with a few fields of activity covered by ECOSOC.  The third cate-
gory is the roster status which may be granted to those NGOs which can make 
an occasional useful contribution to the ECOSOC’s work and are available for 
consultation upon request.  Id. 
 115. See id. at 7–8.  NGOs with a “General Status” can receive the 
ECOSOC’s agenda, propose agenda items, send observers to public meetings, 
circulate statements of 2000 words or less at ECOSOC and subsidiary body 
meetings, speak at meetings and receive invitations to UN conferences.  They 
also must submit quadrennial reports to the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs.  
In contrast, “Special Status” NGOs can receive the ECOSOC agenda, but may 
not propose agenda items.  They may send observers to ECOSOC and subsidi-
ary public meetings, circulate statements of 500 or less words at ECOSOC 
public meetings and 1,500 or less words at ECOSOC subsidiary public meet-
ings, speak at ECOSOC subsidiary meetings (but not at ECOSOC meetings), 
and are also invited to UN Conferences.  Special Status NGOs must also sub-
mit reports to the Committee on NGOs.  “Roster Status” NGOs may receive 
the ECOSOC agenda but may not propose agenda items.  Roster Status NGOs 
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Currently, 1500 accredited NGOs have the right to attend 
conferences, brief member countries, and propose agenda items. 
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 
also has a tiered relationship with NGOs: NGOs are designated 
general, special, or national.116  UNCTAD’s Trade and Develop-
ment Board has granted consultative status to more than 200 
NGOs.  NGOs participate by attending meetings as observers, 
briefing delegates and proposing agenda items.117  UNCTAD also 
facilitates the development of NGOs from the developing world 
by raising funds from the developed world.118  The tiered rela-
tionships or structured frameworks used at ECOSOC and 
UNCTAD are not the only model for UN agencies. 
  
may only send observers to meetings within their field of competence.  They 
may not circulate statements at any ECOSOC public meeting unless invited 
to do so.  Roster Status NGOs may not speak at ECOSOC meetings, unless 
invited by the Secretary-General or a subsidiary body.  Roster Status NGOs 
are invited to UN Conferences and must submit quadrennial reports.  See also 
Press Release, U.N., Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations Con-
cludes Two-week Session (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.un.org (de-
scribing the Committee on NGOs as nineteen members who decide annually 
which NGOs will have consultative status at the ECOSOC and at which tier).  
Currently, the Committee on NGOs includes: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and the U.S.  
Id. 
 116. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 9 (detailing the UNCTAD frame-
work, set out in Article XV of rule 77 of the Trade and Development Board’s 
Rules of Procedure and implementing decision 43(VII) as distinguishing be-
tween general NGOs and special NGOs).  General NGOs have a basic interest 
in the Trade Development Board’s activities while special NGOs bring a spe-
cial competence and specific interest.  The Trade Development Board deter-
mines which NGOs are granted consultative status and which ones receive 
general or special status.  NGOs granted consultative status may send ob-
servers to public meetings, sessional committees, and subsidiary organs.  
They can also circulate documents, may speak upon invitation of the Trade 
Development Board Chair and approval by the members and may propose 
agenda items.  There is also a third relationship category reserved for national 
NGOs that may be consulted after the NGO’s member state has been advised.  
All consultative NGOs receive meeting and conference documentation.  The 
UNCTAD Secretary General may distribute Trade Development Board docu-
ments as the Secretary-General deems appropriate.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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The UN Conference on the Environment and Development 
(“UNCED”)119 is an example of a less formalized mechanism for 
NGO consultation.120  UNCED consulted NGOs in the prepara-
tory work for to the Rio Conference.121  Using the ECOSOC’s 
rules as a framework, more than 1,400 NGOs participated in 
the Rio Conference’s formal and informal meetings,122 made oral 
statements as time permitted,123 and by invitation of the 
UNCED Secretariat, gave input regarding the drafting of 
Agenda 21.124  These UN entities demonstrate that a formal or 
informal consultation process can work within a multilateral 
institution like the WTO whose membership is large and in-
cludes developed and developing countries without impinging 
upon member states’ rights. 
2. Global Economic Institutions 
Looking at other economic institutions provides some insight 
as to how the WTO could facilitate NGO access to decision 
makers.  The World Bank shows the value of a consultative 
process where NGOs have access to institutional staff members.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
is an example of how an institution can facilitate contact be-
tween a multilateral institution, member states and NGOs. 
The World Bank has an NGO Committee125 that is an infor-
mal mechanism for consultation with NGOs.126  The NGO Com-
  
 119. See United Nations Environment Programme, at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Document1D=292 (last visited 
June 4, 2003), for a description of the UN’s environmental programs.  UNCED 
refers to NGOs as “civil society.”  See also United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, Guidelines for Civil Society Participation, at http://www.unep.org/ 
dpdl/cso/default.asp?src=New_guidelines.htm (last visited June 4, 2003).  
While UNCED has no formal definition of “NGO,” its guidelines contain a 
categorization of what organizations qualify as NGOs: “organizational form 
used by . . . such as scientific and professional organizations, service clubs, 
community-based organizations, consumer unions and environmental citizens’ 
organizations . . . .”  The guidelines also identify functions for civil society to 
advance the UN’s environment agenda.  See id. 
 120. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 11. 
 121. Id. at 10. 
 122. Id. at 11. 
 123. See id. at 10–11. 
 124. See id. at 10. 
 125. Id. at 11. 
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mittee is where NGOs can discuss policy with the World Bank 
staff.127  The NGOs and World Bank staff jointly decide on 
agenda items for the World Bank’s meetings.128  The Committee 
is chaired by a Bank staffer and a representative from an 
NGO.129   
Another institution closely related to the WTO is the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). 130  
The OECD also has a less formal credentialing process for 
NGOs.131  Since 1962, labor and employer/industry groups have 
been the primary representatives for non-governmental inter-
ests.132  Their consultative status entitles them access to the Se-
cretariat and government delegations, permission to follow 
OECD committee work, and consultation with the Secretariat 
prior to the OECD’s annual meetings.133  During the annual con-
sultations, the NGOs with consultative status can submit their 
position papers either orally or in writing.134  NGOs also may 
receive general OECD information and some document summa-
ries.135   
The consultation processes at the World Bank and the OECD 
show how institutions tasked with multilateral economic issues 
  
 126. Id. at 11–12 (describing the Committee as being comprised of an NGO 
Steering Committee and World Bank staff).  The Steering Committee consists 
of 15 NGO groups, of which there are 2 representatives each from Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle 
East, and North Africa; 2 international representatives and 1 representative 
each from Europe, North America and Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.  
The members rotate to ensure diversity of opinions.  Id. 
 127. Id. at 11. 
 128. Id. at 12. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See OECD, About: OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/EN/about/0,,EN-
about-0-nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003). 
 131. See ICTSD REPORT supra note 25, at 12 (describing the OECD’s Council 
creating criteria for NGOs to consult with the OECD and its members).  In 
order for the OECD to grant consultative status, the NGOs must: (1) have 
wide responsibility in general economic matters or a specialized related area; 
(2) have affiliated bodies belonging to all or most OECD members; and (3) 
represent non-governmental interests.  Only two groups have consultative 
status — the Trade Union Advisory Committee and the Business and Indus-
try Advisory Group.  Id. 
 132. See id. at 12–13. 
 133. See id. at 12. 
 134. Id. at 13. 
 135. Id.  
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are considerate of NGOs’ viewpoints in their rulemaking and 
policymaking processes.  Furthermore, these institutions show 
how the traditional state-to-state negotiating process has been 
supplanted by a model that factors in all stakeholders’ points of 
view. 
3. The Controversial: International Institutions Consulting 
With NGOs Representing Corporate, Labor, and Environmental 
Stakeholders 
The debate surrounding NGO consultation at the WTO re-
sults from the conflicts between WTO members and NGOs rep-
resenting corporate, labor and environmental issues.  Specifi-
cally, WTO members are wary that corporate NGOs are at-
tempting to dominate the WTO in order to escape domestic 
regulation, and fear that labor and environmental NGOs are 
trying to force the WTO to address issues not necessarily within 
its scope.136  NGOs representing corporate, labor, and environ-
mental interests have funding, strategic direction, and passion, 
and are thus threatening to WTO members.137  For these rea-
  
 136. See Remi Parmentier, David and Goliath Travel to Qatar, BUS. WORLD 
(Manila), Dec. 3, 2001, at P5, available at 2001 WL 31371650.  See also 
Benedek, supra note 97, at 493; Durling, supra note 101, at 143. 
 137. See WOODS, supra note 96, at 15; Porter Interview, supra note 95; 
THOMAS, supra note 102, at 10 (supporting not only the passion of NGOs but 
also highlighting the misinformation propagated by some NGOs).  See also id. 
at 38 (quoting Martin Fleck, Director of Washington State Physicians for So-
cial Responsibility, who stated: “In the WTO rules, governments are not al-
lowed to subsidize industry within their borders.  However there is one big, 
huge, glaring exception, and that’s military work — work that can be defined 
as in the national interests.”); id. at 53 (interpreting Article III of the WTO to 
mean that it is “unlawful for a government to discriminate against products 
that are manufactured, harvested or produced in ways that are destructive to 
people and/or the environment”); id. at 78 (relating an assertion by Charlie 
Kerhaghan, Executive Director of the National Labor Committee, that the 
WTO suggests Nike factory workers in El Salvador get a pay cut from $.60 per 
hour to $.36 per hour).  These are examples of misinformation and mischarac-
terization about the WTO.  Article III of the GATT deals with national treat-
ment.  GATT art. III.  Exceptions to national treatment can be found in Arti-
cle XX and give WTO members the power to withhold national treatment in 
eight circumstances which include those circumstances “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health” and “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunc-
tion with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”  Id. art. XX.  
These exceptions are available provided they are not arbitrary or unjustifiable 
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sons, WTO members are hesitant to grant any consultation 
rights beyond what is already allowed.138  However, other inter-
national institutions consulting with corporate, environmental, 
and labor NGOs provide useful models for the WTO.   
a. NGOs at the International Telecommunication Union and 
International Labor Organization 
Two multilateral institutions have been successful at consult-
ing corporate NGOs in the negotiation process.  The Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union139 (“ITU”) and the Interna-
tional Labor Organization140 (“ILO”) are two models for how gov-
ernments confer with stakeholders during negotiations and 
rulemaking. 
The ITU’s negotiating session, the World Radio Conference 
(“WRC”) was last held in 2000.141  A significant number of NGOs 
representing private telecommunications and satellite compa-
nies, trade associations, and public interest groups were con-
sulted.142  The ITU has three levels of membership: “Member 
States,” which is open only to sovereign states and “sector mem-
bers,” the latter category being open to all other interested and 
competent actors.143  During the WRC, ITU members like the 
U.S. and the European Community placed private stakeholders 
  
or act as a disguised restriction on trade.  Id.  Subsidies are permitted in con-
texts outside of military spending.  See Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. at 1179.  There is 
nothing in the WTO Agreement, or in dispute settlement panel or Appellate 
Body decisions, to support Mr. Kerhagen’s claim alleging the WTO’s ability to 
set wage rates for workers in El Salvador or anywhere else.  This book ignored 
the several hundred NGOs that do understand the WTO’s rules and agree-
ments.  Unfortunately, this book also does a disservice to these responsible 
NGOs who have an understanding of how the WTO operates. 
 138. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100. 
 139. See ITU, at www.itu.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). 
 140. See ILO, at www.ilo.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). 
 141. See Jennifer A. Manner, A Survey: WRC-2000 and IMT-2000: The 
Search for Global Spectrum, 9 COMM. L. CON. 5 (2001). 
 142. See id. at 10. 
 143. See ITU, Membership, at www.itu.int/members.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2003).  Sector members are national entities and organizations engaged in 
telecommunications, radio communications, or development activities such as 
network operators, service providers, manufacturers, consultants, financial 
institutions, university and research, or regulators. 
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holders on their delegations.144  These delegates had access to all 
the government officials and broke down typical diplomatic bar-
riers.145   
This practice also permitted members from the developing 
world to interact with NGOs.146  NGO members of the U.S. dele-
gation did not pressure developing countries to adopt an Ameri-
can perspective through this practice.147  Instead, American 
NGOs learned about the concerns and objectives of member 
states from Latin America and Africa.148  The interactions be-
tween U.S. and European delegates and the delegates from de-
veloping countries required the delegates from the U.S. and 
Europe to fully consider the developing world’s point of view.  
At the end of the WRC, a vote was taken on identifying fre-
quency bands for use by IMT-2000 systems149 and the developing 
world carried the greatest number of votes.150   
The ILO is an example of an international institution which 
consults with NGOs representing corporate and organized labor 
concerns.  The ILO has a tripartite structure: members’ delega-
tions consist of government officials, usually represented by a 
Labor Minister or Secretary; representatives of workers from 
the member states; and representatives of employers from that 
member state.151  The government representative heads the 
delegation.152  The three representatives from a member state 
are not required to agree or vote consistently.  Employer and 
worker NGOs sit on the ILO’s Governing Body along with gov-
ernment representatives.  The Governing Body acts on ILO pol-
icy, elects the ILO’s Director General and establishes programs 
and the budget.153  
  
 144. See Manner, supra note 141, at 13. 
 145. See id. at 24–25. 
 146. See generally id. 
 147. See id. at 22–23. 
 148. See id. at 19–21. 
 149. Id. at 6.  Such systems are commonly known as third generation mobile 
systems. 
 150. See Ambassador Gail Schoettler, Spectrum Allocation: The Developing 
World Must be Heard, 1 EUROP. AFFAIRS (2000), at http://www.european 
affairs.org/archive/2000_fall/2000_fall_66.php4. 
 151. See ILO, at www.ilo.org/public/english/depts/fact.htm (last visited Mar. 
1, 2003). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
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b. NGOs in the Multilateral Environmental Agreements Forum 
WTO members are also concerned about consulting NGOs 
representing environmental groups.  As demonstrated by the 
parade of protesters armored in turtle costumes at Seattle, en-
vironmental groups possess and employ much passion, deter-
mination, and creativity in order to get their message across to 
WTO decision-makers.154  Frustrated by their exclusion from 
meaningful consultation, environmental groups reacted through 
activism.155  Given the close connection between trade and the 
environment, environmental NGOs see their consultation at the 
WTO as justified.156  Moreover, environmental NGOs have also 
come to expect meaningful consultation because of the consulta-
tive role they are granted in several multilateral environmental 
agreements (“MEA”). 
The Convention on Biological Diversity157 grants any NGO 
qualified in conservation, sustainable use of biological diversity, 
or related fields the right to be an observer at the Convention, 
provided that one-third or more of the Convention’s members do 
not object.158  The Secretariat administers the accreditation 
process which grants accredited observers the right to be in-
vited to make oral statements and distribute documents at 
meetings.159  No NGO may vote, nor may they propose agenda 
items.160  Distribution of documents is not at issue because all 
Convention documents are public.161  NGO observers can attend 
almost all meetings except the Budget meetings.162  Other MEAs 
like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora163 and the Montreal Protocol on 
  
 154. See THOMAS, supra note 96, at 28. 
 155. See id.  
 156. See Porter Interview, supra note 95. 
 157. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference 
on the Environment and Development, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). 
 158. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 10. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, art. XI, § 7, 993 U.N.T.S. 
243. 
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Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer164 also follow these 
same procedures for including NGOs in their work.165  These 
organizations are a sampling of international institutions whose 
members are governments, but which also incorporate NGOs 
into their day-to-day activities. 
Consultation procedures adopted by these international insti-
tutions demonstrate that the WTO is tardy in recognizing the 
modern trend toward greater cooperation between NGOs and 
international institutions.  These institutions are highlighted 
not to embarrass or shame, but to persuade the WTO to adopt 
an effective consultation process.  Clearly the WTO has several 
paths it could take in adopting a restructured and more effec-
tive consultation process. 
The WTO could adopt a hierarchical classification of NGOs to 
manage consultation privileges by status.  Like the UN’s agen-
cies, the WTO could create tiers that would organize NGO con-
sultation privileges by size, subject matter of an NGO’s focus or 
a particular WTO sub-agreement.  Emulating UNCED, the 
WTO might consult with NGOs during the negotiations or pre-
paratory work for an agreement.   
The WTO can also adopt a consultation process like the 
World Bank.  According to this model, the WTO could 
strengthen the Secretariat’s role in setting agendas for WTO 
negotiations.  Similarly, the OECD’s informal process could be 
attractive to the WTO because it manages NGOs’ interaction 
with delegations, coordination with the institution’s staff and 
access to staff.   
The ITU, ILO, and MEAs demonstrate how the WTO could ef-
fectively consult with NGOs in a constructive manner.  These 
institutions demonstrate how international institutions can ef-
fectively consult NGOs without infringing the rights of institu-
tions’ member states.  The WTO would also be able to raise 
money through NGO dues, which can be invested into building 
capacity for developing countries and less developed countries. 
  
 164. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 
XI, ¶ 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.  The Montreal Protocol was amended 
four times: in London, 1990; in Copenhagen, 1992; in Montreal, 1997; and in 
Beijing, 1999.  See UN, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/ 
partI/chapterXXVII/treaty12.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). 
 165. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 10. 
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Three important observations can be drawn from the prac-
tices of these international institutions.  First, the WTO is not 
on par with other international institutions with regard to hav-
ing an effective consultative structure that considers the collec-
tive expertise, knowledge and diverse views of NGOs.  Second, 
consultation with NGOs need not result in a reduction of the 
rights or power of any WTO member.  Third, any consultation 
structure devised by the WTO, would still be subject to approval 
by its members who could engineer and determine which NGOs 
are consulted and at which level.   
The institutions that are connected to their stakeholders and 
civil society support the broader point that the level of interac-
tion between international institutions and the individuals, 
which these institutions are intended to benefit, is improving so 
that public interests beyond those of the sovereign are more 
fully incorporated.  To be sure, the traditional model, which 
only allows states to have a role at international institutions, is 
outdated and inefficient.  Consultation with NGOs in negotia-
tion and rulemaking will result in the WTO accomplishing its 
overall objectives and the Doha development agenda.   
As the case has been made for the WTO to change the way it 
consults with NGOs in negotiations and rulemaking, a separate 
analysis is required to determine what level of NGO consulta-
tion within the WTO’s dispute resolution process is appropriate. 
V. FRIEND OR FOE: NGOS IN THE WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROCESS 
A comparison to other international institutions’ dispute set-
tlement processes is not helpful in deciding what role NGOs 
should have within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  
The above-mentioned institutions’ procedures for resolving dis-
putes seem archaic in comparison to the WTO.166  The main 
  
 166. See ZIRING ET AL., supra note 21, at 353 (describing the UN’s dispute 
settlement procedures as recommendations as non-binding).  The UN Charter 
seeks the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiation, arbitration, con-
ciliation, and use of good offices.  The UN Charter acknowledges the most 
effective means of dispute resolution is through bilateral negotiations.  Id.  
See also Bank Information Center, The World Bank Inspection Panel, at 
http://www.bicusa.org/mdbs/wbg/inspectionpanel/index.htm (last visited June 
4, 2003) (describing the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, the means for indi-
viduals and NGOs to redress actual or potential harm to their interests from 
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criticisms are their dispute resolution methods are not binding 
and their rulings are unenforceable.  The debate can only be 
analyzed in the context of the WTO and its rules.  The issue can 
be broken down into two claims NGOs have made for greater 
consultation at the WTO.  The first claim relates to a funda-
mental change in the WTO’s dispute settlement process: allow-
ing NGOs and other non-state parties to file disputes against 
governments.  The second claim is that NGOs and other non-
parties should be able to submit amicus briefs to a panel or the 
Appellate Body.  The positions and concerns WTO member 
states need to be considered as well.  The WTO’s dispute set-
tlement system will unlikely change to allow private actors, 
e.g., NGOs, to file claims, but the practice of NGOs submitting 
amicus briefs to panels for review will develop further.  The 
task for WTO members is to structure a system which will in-
corporate NGOs without infringing on the rights of WTO mem-
bers.   
These differences must be recognized when analyzing the role 
of NGOs in the WTO dispute resolution, either as complainants 
or parties in the dispute or as consultants through amicus 
briefs.  The WTO’s dispute resolution system is different than 
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the international institu-
tions mentioned above.167   
The WTO’s dispute resolution system has revolutionized the 
resolution of disputes between members of international insti-
tutions by making its results binding on its members.168  Under 
  
World Bank projects).  The Inspection Panel process has had a tarnished track 
record of success given that Bank management has been found to intervene in 
investigations.  See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
TEXTS AND MATERIALS 1129 (Karin Oellers-Frahm & Andreas Zimmerman 
eds., 2001) (describing the process for resolving disputes between ITU mem-
bers which includes diplomacy, procedures under bilateral and multilateral 
treaties or any other method mutually agreed upon).  Parties may also resolve 
disputes through arbitration.  A party in theory may choose not to resolve a 
dispute.  See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 19 (concluding that the WTO’s 
dispute settlement process has a different character than other institutions).  
Arrangements with NGOs regarding dispute resolution require the binding 
and enforceable nature of WTO decisions to be considered. 
 167. See Benedek, supra note 97, at 491–92. 
 168. See Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dis-
pute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 370 
(Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).  See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 125–26. 
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the GATT dispute resolution system, which was purely a diplo-
matic process, a contracting party could choose not to comply 
with a GATT panel decision.169  This defect in the GATT was 
acknowledged and its change was a priority during the Uru-
guay Round negotiations which produced the Understanding on 
the Settlement of Disputes.170 
The Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes171 (“Dispute 
Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”) affirms that the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system is a process for members to resolve 
disputes.172  There are no provisions for non-WTO members to 
bring a claim.173  Dispute settlement panels are empowered un-
der Article 13 to seek information from any source, which, as 
interpreted, includes individuals and NGOs.174  Panels have in-
terpreted that provision to mean that a panel can actively re-
quest information, accept unsolicited information, and can dis-
regard information.175  The Appellate Body under Article 17.9 of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding has the power to define 
its working procedures in coordination with the Chairman of 
the Dispute Settlement Body and the WTO Director-General.176  
The Appellate Body has interpreted this provision as permitting 
it to request information from NGOs in the form of amicus 
briefs.177  NGOs’ claims should be examined, against this impor-
tant treaty and factual background.   
The first claim, that NGOs have standing to bring a dispute 
at the WTO, has little support outside of the NGO community.178  
  
 169. See Hudec, supra note 168, at 370. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Annex 2, in THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS—THE LEGAL TEXTS, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
 172. Id. art. 1. 
 173. See generally id. 
 174. Id. art. 13.  See infra Figure 5. 
 175. See infra Figure 5. 
 176. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171, art. 17.9. 
 177. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 78, § 50. 
 178. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100 (describing India’s justification 
against third party NGOs involved in WTO dispute settlement as counter-
productive because they will impede the diplomatic process).  But see John A. 
Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO: Access to the System: Can the WTO DSB Live 
Up to the Moniker “World Trade Court”?, 31 LAW & POL’Y. INT’L. BUS. 754 
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Under the DSU’s rules, NGOs have no power to bring cases be-
fore the WTO.179  Although some scholars agree that NGOs 
should have the ability to file complaints because NGOs repre-
sent the victims and beneficiaries of the multilateral trading 
system, the WTO’s rules do not support this argument.180  NGOs 
also assert that they, like any interested actor, should have 
standing.181  However, as equitable as the assertion sounds, the 
WTO lacks any means for NGOs to accomplish this goal by 
their own accord.  Another suggestion is that private parties 
could also function as private attorneys general, similar to 
American antitrust law, putting pressure on the more powerful 
players to obey the rules.182  This follows from the view that gov-
ernments can not represent all interests related to a dispute.183  
However, the suggestion might result in private persons, and by 
extension, NGOs suing their own governments at the WTO, 
which does not seem to be the best use of the dispute resolution 
system.184  Practically, there is little incentive for WTO members 
to vote to make this systemic change.185  This result follows from 
the fact that the WTO’s dispute resolution system is not purely 
judicial.186  Furthermore, the binding dispute resolution system 
  
(2000) (referencing Article 50 of the International Court of Justice’s Statute 
permitting international courts to accept amicus briefs). 
 179. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171. 
 180. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 94–95. 
 181. See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 215. 
 182. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 94–95. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. at 95. 
 185. See Durling, supra note 101, at 154. 
 186. See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 125–26 (classifying the dispute settle-
ment system as a rules-based system focusing on the rule of law).  While this 
point of view accurately describes the actual panel process, disputes are not 
resolved only through litigation at the panel level.  Cf. Hudec, supra note 168, 
at 370 (asserting that the system is quasi-judicial evolving from the third 
viewpoint, a diplomatic process).  But see Ragosta, supra note 178, at 739, 741 
(describing the WTO as attempting to be a Court for International Trade with 
the potential to create international trade common law).  However, Ragosta’s 
viewpoint ignores that a panel finding does not necessarily translate into a 
remedy in terms of a legal ruling.  Diplomacy also prevails in many cases in 
determining a member’s compliance with a panel’s finding.  The reality is that 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system is, for lack of a better word, quasi-
judicial.  See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171, art. 3.  The 
WTO resolves disputes through litigation at the panel and appellate processes 
as well as through conciliation, mediation and arbitration.  Consequently, the 
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has become a tool for WTO members to accomplish their trade 
priorities.187   
In conclusion, NGOs will not achieve consultation through 
complainant status because the WTO’s dispute resolution sys-
tem is not a purely judicial entity.  As no incentive exists for 
WTO members to change the plainly-worded rules defining who 
may bring disputes, it is improbable that this change will oc-
cur.188  However, the actions of the panels and the Appellate 
Body support the argument that consultation with NGOs is de-
sired in some cases by way of amicus briefs. 
According to the WTO’s dispute settlement rules, NGOs do 
not per se have the right to submit amicus briefs to WTO dis-
pute settlement panels and the Appellate Body.  Rather, panels 
including the Appellate Body have interpreted the rules as 
granting to them the discretion to seek amicus briefs from NGO 
experts and the ability to accept unsolicited briefs.  This inter-
pretation of the rules has troubled and angered some WTO 
members who characterize the panels’ decisions as overstepping 
their mandate.189  This tension between WTO members and the 
dispute resolution officials highlights the change occurring in 
the treatment of NGO-submitted amicus briefs. 
  
last three dispute settlement mechanisms reveal that diplomacy is alive and 
well at the dispute settlement process.   
 187. See Durling, supra note 101, at 144–45.  Members bring disputes for a 
variety of reasons.  Disputes are commenced when they are of economic im-
portance to a member as in EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), 1998 WL 25520, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDF 
Documents/t/WT/DS/26-13.WPF.  Disputes are often brought for political rea-
sons as perceived in the recent World Trade Organization Appellate Body 
Report, United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” 
WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108ABR.DOC, and in the World Trade Organization 
Dispute Panel Report, U.S. Complaint Concerning E.C. Regime for the Impor-
tation, Sale And Distribution Of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/27RUSA.WPF.  
See William M. Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 65 
(2001)  WTO members also bring disputes because they hope to bring about 
systemic change within the WTO.  See Durling, supra note 101, at 144–45.  
Thus, despite the attempts of NGOs and other non-WTO actors to character-
ize the dispute settlement system as a court, it maintains its own unique 
characterization. 
 188. See WTO Agreement art. 9, ¶ 1 (describing the decision making process 
in the WTO as consensus based.  Any member can block changes to the DSU.). 
 189. See India protests, supra note 79. 
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Despite this change, the resistance to the resolution of con-
sultation between the WTO and NGOs through amicus briefs is 
worth considering.  This resistance focuses on WTO members’ 
concerns that well-funded, more powerful NGOs will destroy 
the effective dispute resolution system by allocating more power 
to themselves than to WTO members.190  Contrary to this view-
point — and more supportive of the WTO as an institution — is 
the argument that NGO-submitted amicus briefs offer greater 
benefits. 
One concern is that panels have the ability to craft new WTO 
policy that may not have been foreseen during the negotiation 
process.191  Granting NGOs access to the panels might give them 
more power than some WTO members to influence WTO pol-
icy.192   
WTO members are concerned about NGOs’ financial ability to 
fund advocacy at the WTO.  Some WTO members are suspicious 
of NGOs because often the NGOs’ funding and agenda are un-
disclosed.193  A related concern is that an open amicus brief 
process will result in highly skilled law firms not representing 
environmental and human rights NGOs, but well-funded indus-
try or corporate groups instead.194  NGOs that had the resources 
to continue to submit briefs would become more successful and 
have a more persuasive role.195  This thought leads to the point 
that amicus briefs might lose their function as information de-
vices and become lobbying mechanisms, and this would raise 
systemic concerns.196 
Another criticism is that any movement away from the WTO 
as being state-centered would threaten the WTO as a system.197  
Systemic concerns include the notion that the dispute settle-
  
 190. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100.  But see USTR Calls for Addi-
tional Progress on WTO Transparency (Apr. 4, 2000), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov.  The United States called for the WTO to make several 
reforms to increase transparency.  Permitting interested stakeholders to file 
amicus briefs was only one suggestion.  USTR repeated this call in October 
2000 and again in August 2002.  Id. 
 191. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99. 
 192. See id. at 100. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 106. 
 197. See id. at 100. 
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ment process is too short to accommodate what could be a flood 
of briefs, making the process unworkable.198  A related concern 
is that NGOs submitting amicus briefs will prevent effective 
and speedy dispute resolution.199  These systemic concerns need 
to be addressed seriously and fairly. 
The concerns over the money and influence of NGOs on the 
WTO by way of amicus briefs assume that the decision to allow 
amicus briefs would have no parameters.  The process crafted 
by the Appellate Body in the EC—Asbestos case, allowing 
amicus briefs, offers a promising and workable solution that 
would satisfy all members.200  WTO members could modify the 
EC—Asbestos process to channel amicus brief submissions so as 
not to overwhelm the dispute resolution system or impinge on 
any WTO members’ rights or power.  More importantly, this 
subject is up for debate.  NGOs and supporters of increased 
NGO consultation by way of amicus briefs must make their case 
that this type of consultation offers many benefits for the WTO. 
By developing a concrete mechanism for consultation via 
amicus briefs, the WTO can deflect criticism that its dispute 
resolution system lacks transparency, fairness and legitimacy.201  
These arguments could be dismissed if NGOs had an opportu-
nity to present their information, expertise and viewpoints 
through amicus briefs.202  Critics who assert that some NGOs 
are working behind the scenes at the WTO would be silenced be 
opening the process, and promoting fairness.203  By opening up 
and regulating the NGO participation process, WTO members 
could manage the consultation of NGOs. 204   
Another criticism is that the dispute settlement system lacks 
legitimacy because in practice panels seem unreceptive to NGO 
amicus briefs.  One prominent example illustrating this point 
was the 21.5 Proceeding205 in the Shrimp-Turtle case.206  Envi-
  
 198. See Ragosta, supra note 178, at 755. 
 199. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99. 
 200. See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 78, § 52. 
 201. See Durling, supra note 101, at 152, 154–55.  
 202. See Ragosta, supra note 178, at 751. 
 203. See Durling, supra note 101, at 154. 
 204. See id. at 156 (advocating that by opening the WTO dispute settlement 
to amicus briefs will also build legitimacy for the system and its outcomes). 
 205. Report of the Appellate Body, United States — Import Prohibition Of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-2001-4, adopted Oct. 22, 2001, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ 
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ronmental groups submitted an amicus brief which was at-
tached to the U.S. government brief.207  The panel only consid-
ered the brief’s points that were consistent with the U.S.’s ar-
guments.208  However, if the WTO created parameters triggering 
panel consultation with NGOs and these parameters were in-
tended to fully utilize NGO consultation without hindering 
WTO members’ rights, then this issue would be resolved. 
Essential to this argument is that the WTO’s rules on NGO 
consultation need to be written to allow for flexibility to accom-
modate the concerns of WTO members, especially the special 
and differential treatment of developing and less developed 
countries.  For example, when the parties sought to establish a 
panel, they could request that the panel set parameters for 
amicus brief submissions.  A panel certainly has the authority 
to tell NGOs how long a brief could be, how many briefs could 
be submitted and the deadlines for submission.209  Panels also 
have the authority to accommodate the interests of developing 
countries and less developed countries by setting specific condi-
tions for amicus briefs.210  One suggestion is to limit amicus 
briefs to only those NGOs from the developing world when de-
veloping countries are parties.  Important to note in this propo-
sition is that the WTO members would be defining the rules, 
not NGOs nor dispute settlement panel members.  An impor-
tant point in this analysis is that NGOs can contribute to the 
WTO’s dispute resolution procedure.  For too long, the benefit of 
NGOs’ contribution has been perceived to be outweighed by the 
costs. 
NGOs can make valuable contributions to the dispute settle-
ment system through amicus brief submissions.  It is unlikely 
that NGOs will be complainants in the dispute settlement proc-
ess.  WTO members still view the right to complain as an inter-
governmental process that has legal, arbitral and diplomatic 
features.  Nevertheless, NGOs still have a stake in the outcome 
  
WT/DS/58ABRW.doc. 
 206. See Porter Interview, supra note 95.   
 207. See id. 
 208. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99 (positing that interest groups un-
duly influence the WTO based on their identity and resources). 
 209. See Figure 5, supra (describing WTO panel and appellate body deci-
sions listing panels authority regarding amicus briefs). 
 210. See id. 
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of disputes, because they, like WTO members, collectively ac-
count for the interests that will be affected by compliance or an 
adverse ruling.  A diplomatic compromise could come in the 
form of a managed amicus brief procedure which would include 
panelists considering briefs.  The Appellate Body in EC — As-
bestos showed how the amicus brief situation can be managed to 
achieve the system’s goals.  WTO members should not criticize 
the Appellate Body as acting outside its scope but embrace the 
decision and draft workable procedures. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NGO PARTICIPATION AT THE WTO 
First and foremost, the WTO needs to adopt a definition of 
the term NGO that includes those groups that will further the 
WTO’s mission.  The second priority must be to develop a mean-
ingful consultative status for NGOs.  NGOs have interests in 
the WTO and should be recognized for the contributions they 
make to the global society.  In exchange for consultative status, 
NGOs could be required to pay membership dues based on the 
NGOs’ annual budget.  Special provisions should be made for 
NGOs from developing and less developed countries so as to 
encourage their consultation.  NGOs with consultative status 
should provide information on their organizations’ membership, 
officers, purpose and source of funding.  NGOs with consulta-
tive status would also submit annual reports about their activi-
ties with the WTO.   
With consultative status, NGOs would be permitted to ob-
serve WTO negotiations, be able to address delegates at the in-
vitation of the Director-General, and submit position papers 
within a certain page limit that would be distributed to delega-
tions.  Consultative status would be open to all NGOs whose 
activities had relevance to the WTO’s activities.211  A committee 
of WTO members would review applications for consultative 
status, present those NGOs that qualify to the General Council 
and grant consultative status unless there was a consensus that 
status should not be granted. 
Most of the NGOs that have submitted amicus briefs have not 
participated in any other WTO activity.  NGOs that wish to be 
stakeholders need to work at all levels of the WTO, not just 
  
 211. WTO Agreement art. V, ¶ 2. 
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those that seem to suit their immediate concerns.  This does not 
mean that NGOs have to participate in every WTO meeting or 
dispute.  The point is offered to advise NGOs on a means to gain 
greater credibility and trust of WTO members.  NGOs with con-
sultative status would have the privilege of submitting amicus 
briefs at disputes concerning their organization.  However, it 
seems appropriate for WTO members to adopt a provisional pe-
riod for the dispute settlement system to be accustomed to this 
process.  During the provisional period, the Secretariat and dis-
pute settlement body should analyze the interests of NGOs 
submitting amicus briefs.  Special provisions should also be 
made for disputes involving developing and less developed 
countries. 
Panels can also use their discretion to limit the page numbers 
and number of briefs submitted in an individual dispute.  NGOs 
often cite their lack of resources as preventing them from over-
whelming the panels with numerous, lengthy briefs.  As seen in 
the Shrimp-Turtle212 and other cases, there is nothing to prevent 
NGO members from collaborating on an amicus brief.  Panel-
ists, at the beginning of disputes, need to show that they are 
willing to accept NGO briefs, especially in those disputes where 
panels require expert advice and knowledge.  For the most part, 
panelists are trade generalists and do not always have the ex-
pertise in the various subjects in dispute, such as intellectual 
property, financial services, telecommunications and tax.213 
  
 212. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report, Malaysia - 
Complaint Concerning U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58RW.doc.  
 213. See, e.g., Echols, supra note 42, at 207 (defining the need for NGOs to 
serve as experts for panels reviewing SPS measures).  See also Note by the 
Secretariat, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Con-
stitution of the Panel at the Request of the United States, WT/DS204/4 (Aug. 
30, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/204-
4.doc (listing the composition of the panel in the dispute over telecommunica-
tions services between the U.S. and Mexico.  Panelists include Ernest Ulrich-
Petersman, Chairman, a world-renowned trade expert, Raymond Tam, and 
Björn Wellenius.  Concerns over the Panel’s capability of comprehending the 
complex issues related to this dispute are dispelled by examining the back-
ground of Mr. Wellenius, Telecommunications Adviser, Telecommunications 
and Informatics Division of the World Bank.). 
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These recommendations are not an exhaustive list.  They 
suggest a means by which the WTO may adjust to the evolving 
modern state of relations between multilateral institutions, 
member states and NGOs representing the individuals intended 
to benefit from the multilateral institutions. 
The main conclusion to which these recommendations aspire 
is the idea that NGOs can be a partner for the WTO.  NGOs will 
never replace WTO members, but as global actors they have a 
role at the WTO.  WTO members need to include NGOs in all of 
the system’s activities. 
Seri Raffia Azziz, the Malaysian Minister of Trade said that 
globalization needs a human face, with wrinkles and all.214  Her 
message was that the spread of globalization’s benefits is an 
evolving process.  Her comment is applicable to NGOs’ roles at 
the WTO.  NGOs can put a human face on the WTO.  However, 
like the humans the NGOs represent, they need to be included. 
The WTO is a fledgling institution, still developing its iden-
tity in the global economy.  Since its inception, the WTO has 
increased its membership to more than 145 countries with an-
other 31 observer countries that are preparing for membership.  
The WTO survived the Seattle protests.  It has also seen over 
280 complaints resolved through consultation, arbitration, liti-
gation and diplomacy.  Clearly, the WTO members want the 
organization to survive, and this depends on its acknowledge-
ment that the classical diplomatic model on which the GATT 
was founded and which has influenced the WTO, is evolving 
into a model more suited to an interconnected global economy.  
The players in the multilateral trading environment are no 
longer only governments.  NGOs have an important role in the 
multilateral trade arena. 
NGOs deserve a more realistic and effective consultative 
place at the WTO negotiation and dispute settlement tables.  
More effective NGO consultation will ensure the WTO’s sur-
vival.  This paper recommends more effective NGO consulta-
tion, not control.  In the end, the WTO members will still write 
the rules and cast the votes.  WTO members do not have to cede 
any power for NGOs to be consulted effectively. 
  
 214. See Like Ageing, Let it Happen Slowly, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 8, 2001, 
available at WL27365681. 
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In conclusion, as WTO members are tasked by the Doha Min-
isterial Declaration to conduct negotiations that will improve 
the lives of all people, especially those in the developing world, 
partnering with NGOs is a smart step in reaching that goal.  
